WHEN you have a supreme disruptor of the global order, then politicians inevitably scurry around conjuring up mitigation, containment, appeasement or retaliation strategies. Inaction, procrastination and negotiation from a position of weakness simply exacerbates the playbook.
Only Canada’s nascent Prime Minister Mark Carney among world leaders has had the chutzpah to confront the delusional President Donald Trump head-on, stressing that “Canada will never become the 51st state of the USA” implying that Ottawa was taking the annexation threat seriously, and slamming reciprocal tariffs on its neighbour, its largest trading partner to boot.
Carney, a prominent economist, calling a snap election on April 28 is either a master stroke if he wins, or a destiny with irony if he loses, for his opponent arch conservative and free marketeer Pierre Poilievre is the Canadian wannabe Trump.
Carney’s Liberal Party was in electoral meltdown following strong voter disillusionment with erstwhile premier Justin Trudeau, who to his credit resigned. Trump’s accession to a second term in the White House and his unilateral diatribe against Canada and a host of other countries especially South Africa, was a godsend, reversing voter sentiments in the Canadian polity to the extent that the Liberals under Carney now have a slight lead in the polls.
That March 2025 was South Africa’s ‘mensis horribilis’ is clear and present – a month in which relations between Pretoria and Washington sunk to a nadir following the unceremonious expulsion of Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool as persona non grata in the US allegedly for being “a race baiting politician who hates America”. He had accused President Trump of trying to "project white victimhood (in South Africa) as a dog whistle" after the president stressed that white Afrikaners were facing discrimination and expropriation of their land, which was dismissed as blatant lies.
There is a backlog of unfinished business between the Trump administration and the GNU ranging from South Africa’s continued membership of AGOA, the freeze in funding for HIV projects run by USAID and its partners in South Africa, a review of bilateral trade and investment and so on. How these pan out will have a material effect on the outcomes of national economic and financial policies both in the short and medium term.
As if Trump’s agenda for relations with Pretoria is not enough. The main partners in the GNU have become protagonists relating to the 2025 National Budget, with the second largest party in the GNU, the DA, rejecting Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana’s budget presented to parliament on March 10 primarily over a 1% rise in VAT.
The budget must be approved by parliament and without the DA support, the ANC led coalition would lose the vote thus pre-empting fresh elections. Alternatively, the ANC would need to seek support elsewhere – perhaps from its arch enemies the EEF or former President Jacob Zuma’s MK Party, which is highly unlikely, or an act of extreme desperation, which could undermine its credibility.
Unless of course rating agency Moody’s is privy to information the rest of us are not. Moody's expects the GNU to reach a compromise that allows the deadlocked budget to pass with its focus on fiscal consolidation intact. "Our baseline is for the GNU to reach a compromise, leading to an orderly approval of the budget. Continued friction within the GNU means there may still be some changes to fiscal measures before parliament approves the budget, but we expect the budget's overall focus on fiscal consolidation to remain,” said Moody's in an issuer comment on March 17.
Trump and the GNU aside, there are several other options for the government to optimise, but with much greater urgency. In mid-March South Africa consolidated its relations with the EU at the 8th Summit of South Africa and the EU in Cape Town hosted by President Ramaphosa and attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. The EU is one of South Africa’s largest trading partners and investors.
As such the adoption of a Clean Trade and Investment Partnership to develop value chains that are more environmentally sustainable fits in with and is a test of South Africa’s new Green Finance Taxonomy and its international interoperability and usability. The partners are aware of the move to a low-carbon global economy by agreeing to improving conditions for investment in the extraction and local beneficiation of rare minerals, renewable energy, low carbon hydrogen and clean technology. This should enable South African companies to export products like sustainable fuel and electric and hybrid vehicles to the EU.
The icing on the cake was an EU investment package worth €4.7bn (R90bn) – to support investment projects in South Africa. Some €4.4bn is directed to South Africa’s clean and just energy transition, an investment underscoring the EU’s commitment to tackling climate change and supporting South Africa in its renewable energy ambitions, in line with the Scaling up Renewables in Africa campaign.
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2024 saw a record-breaking progress in renewable energy global deployment, but persisting challenges remain in significant geographic disparities, leaving many countries behind.
With 585 GW of capacity additions, renewables accounted for over 90% of total power expansion globally. South Africa has renewables cooperation with ACWA Power, a subsidiary of the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, which operates three power projects in the Northern Cape. It has good relations with Masdar in Abu Dhabi, one of the world’s largest renewable energy investors and drivers of energy transition. But Pretoria’s relations with the Middle East and North Africa region are disjointed and grossly underutilised.
One conduit to greater ties with the region and beyond is the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) with its 57 member states including 21 from Sub-Saharan Africa and the North African countries. The OIC as a trade bloc is one of the most powerful in the world given its geopolitical and geographic reach and diversity with its total trade and investment amounting to just under USD6 trillion in 2023 and intra-OIC trade and investment amounting just under USD2 trillion. Contrary to popular misconceptions, the OIC is not an exclusive club of Muslim countries.
Mozambique and Uganda, both Christian majority countries are members of the OIC and its organs of which the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) is the second largest multilateral development bank after the World Bank in terms of capital and assets.
There are also the ITFC, the trade fund; the ICD, the private sector fund; and ICIEC the multilateral credit and investment insurer – all sister organisations of the IsDB, all of which are already very active on the African continent. Despite an initial interest by the late Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, successive South African governments have inexplicably overlooked the possibility of joining the OIC and its organs. This would have resulted in billions of dollars of trade, investment and concessionary funding – an opportunity that has been lost over 30 years.
In February the IsDB pledged USD4.65bn to support the Africa Energy Mission 300 Initiative, joining forces with the World Bank, AfDB, and other partners. This commitment, stressed IsDB President Dr Muhammad Al Jasser, underscores the IsDB’s dedication to bridging Africa's energy gap of 600mn people still living without electricity and accelerating socio-economic development. Alas South Africa as a non-member will not feature as a recipient.
The other three scenarios are less complex. Economic relations with China will continue as is, but the uncertainties in BRICS with President Putin seemingly siding with Trump on several issues, and in SSA with the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AcFTA) still beset with incorporation and cross border issues, will result in subdued trade and investment traction.
Parker is an economist and writer based in London